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ABSTRACT
This political project analyzes documents within the foreign policy archives of the Bush Jr., Obama,
and Trump administrations to tell a story of how U.S. imperial relations are constructed to
reproduce differential rule, exploitation, and the distribution of subject positions. Through a
combination of postcolonial critiques of imperial knowledge production and poststructuralist
discourse analysis, I argue that these documents expose how U.S. officials construct Afghanistan as
a regime-made disaster, a nation-state enclave for unfettered U.S. pointillism and unequal
integration into the imperial world order. In addition, the documents reveal how U.S. officials
reproduce the nation and perpetuate the imperial condition through the construction of U.S.
citizens as citizen-perpetrators, figures outside and above the “realm of imperial accountability”
(Azoulay, Potential History, 554). This project is meant to serve as a commitment to ongoing efforts
for U.S. citizens to reclaim the right to not be a perpetrator and begin the labor of reparations
necessary to revive a shared world.
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INTRODUCTION
America cannot occupy the world. It must learn to live in it.
Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim (2004), pg. 260
Afghanistan has long been a site of imperial enterprise and colonial exploitation. Often cited
as the “Graveyard of Empires,” Afghanistan was the site of three wars between Britain and the
tsarist Russian regime during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Afghan state
emerged from intense geopolitical intervention of imperial regimes and the construction of
arbitrary colonial borders without consideration for the local populations, such as the Durand Line
which eventually became the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.1 As representatives of the
state worked to center international structures around U.S. leadership in the mid to late twentieth
century, the U.S. expanded involvement into Afghanistan. Almost three-quarters of a century later,
the U.S. continues to occupy and dictate the governance of Afghanistan. In early 2021, the U.S. began
what representatives of the state and policy-makers framed as a “withdrawal” that will end the
“forever war” in Afghanistan, reigniting the debate around whether Afghanistan is the site of the
death of Empire.
Yet, in discussions on the topic of Imperialism, scholars often reproduce ambiguity and
conceptual conflation in their attempts to represent “Imperialism” as a uniform, definable analytic
category. Analysis of the imperial condition becomes difficult as there is no singular, accepted
conceptualization of “Imperialism.” According to Robert J.C. Young, the Roman Imperial structure
serves as the paradigm for the conceptualization of Empire, an imperium led by a supreme
sovereign ruler driven by a desire for territorial expansion, wealth, and power. Colonialism, he
states, is the construction of a colonial system through obtaining and managing colonies.2 Agents of
Empire build and maintain their colonial holdings and relations through the production of

1
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Gregory, The Colonial Present, 13 and 30-31.
Young, Empire, Colony, Postcolony, 15-27.
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knowledge and imperial epistemologies that underpin neocolonial forms of domination. Colonies
represent a particular manifestation of a larger imperial network which is “the product and
possession of the imperial state from its centered position.”3 Imperialism can be seen as “the
practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant
territory.”4 As empires grow, imperial agents require practices, theories, and attitudes that facilitate
expansion. The “realization of the imperial imagination”5 in the form of colonialism and empirebuilding stem from a broader systemic project of global domination and exploitation that is vast
and constantly adapting to changing world conditions. Hence, the term “Imperialism,” di-embedded
from the context of its production, fails to serve as a politically useful analytic category.
Therefore, analysis of U.S. policies in Afghanistan can get lost in the debate of whether
Afghanistan is or is not an example of “U.S. Imperialism.” Anti-imperialist activists face the difficult,
yet necessary task of historicizing the present while maintaining a balance between gross
generalizations and crude relativizations.6 Rather than reliance on a label to define what is, analysts
and scholars can shift away from reified categories and towards narrative storytelling to describe
how the world is made through social, political, economic, and epistemic processes. With more
situated analysis, scholars can produce work with conceptual clarity and anti-imperial potential
rather than “saddl[ing] us with a blunt, flat, undifferentiated vocabulary.”7 This project uses
Afghanistan as a case study to tell the story of how the U.S. has and continues to construct imperial
relations and ultimately ensure the reproduction of the U.S. imperial state. Combining
poststructuralist discourse analysis and postcolonial critique of imperial knowledge production, I

Young, Empire, Colony, Postcolony, 53. Young loosely categories “colonies” into three types: settlements, areas of
exploitation, and military garrisons.
4 Said, Culture and Imperialism, 9. See also Hook, “Frantz Fanon, Steve Biko, ‘psychopolitics’ and critical psychology,” 88.
5 Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies, 23.
6 Wallerstein, European Universalism, 81-83. See also Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History and
Ferguson, Global Shadows. These authors outline the often-problematic usage of broad analytic categories, such as
“Colonialism” and “Globalization,” in favor of relational terminology and analyses that facilitate conceptual clarity and
attention to contextual specificity.
7 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 90.
3
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argue that U.S. foreign policy functions as an archive in service of U.S. imperial world-building and
the socialization of U.S. citizens to accept U.S. violence. The documents in these archives reveal how
the Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations frame the relationship between the U.S. and
Afghanistan in ways that facilitate the construction of Afghanistan as an imperial point in the larger
U.S. empire and the even larger imperial world order. Therefore, this project is both academic and
political, an attempt to unlearn imperial subjectivity, expose the U.S.’s continued role in imperial
enterprise in Afghanistan and throughout the world, and reiterate the call that “America cannot
occupy the world. It must learn to live in it.”8
In this thesis, I tell the story of how U.S. leaders, experts, and foreign policy-makers
construct imperial relations through the archival regime of foreign policy. Through the construction
of imperial points, they produce and incorporate securitized enclaves like Afghanistan into an
imperial world order designed to perpetuate imperial projects and exploitation. To avoid the
complete collapse of U.S. empire-building, policy-makers focus on efforts to balance imperial points
so that U.S. interventionism is maintained through increasingly covert operations and imperial
learning. This process relies on the normalization of U.S. violence and the socialization of the U.S.
public into complicity. In telling this story and exposing the violence of the U.S. archival regime, I
aim to interrupt the imperial knowledge production that undermines an ethics of care for our
shared world and hold representatives of the state, policy-makers, and citizen-perpetrators
accountable for imperial crimes in Afghanistan. With this project, I hope to join countless efforts to
unlearn imperial epistemologies and engage in the permanent self-critique necessary to begin the
labor of reparations necessary to revive a shared world.

Approach: Discourse Analysis and Foreign Policy

8

Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, 260.
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Hermeneutic studies, the study of the theories of interpretation, can be a valuable form of
analysis to begin to unpack the nuances of our shared imperial condition. Since people understand
and make sense of their world through various modes of mediated representation, politics and
political processes rely on textuality for meaning and value-making. 9 Political actors produce social
meaning through the introduction, and circulation of representations. Politicians, media
personalities, academics, and so-called “experts” articulate, challenge, and (re)produce foreign
policy discourse through interaction and negotiation of social meaning and the terms of its
expression.10 However, no singular entity possesses a monopoly on authority or the production of
social meaning. Since who is permitted to speak with authority and legitimacy changes, leading
officials often use their proximity to political institutions and power to imbue representations with
legitimacy and authority.11 In doing so, imperial agents can construct lenses of interpretation and
hierarchies of “truth” to influence, control, and govern actual bodies through the institutionalization
of representations in official discourse.
Discourses are systems of knowledge, ideas, and representations that produce meaning
about certain social relations or phenomena and frame not only how the world appears but also
who has the authority to speak. Used in the construction and maintenance of regimes of “truth,”
discourses are a production of their historical context. Discourses are not fixed totalities, they are
adaptable and malleable to changing world conditions and the imperial ambition of those in power
to normalize hierarchical relations of power and “inscribe[s] in the social world a new conception
of space, new forms of personhood, and a new means of manufacturing the experience of the real.”12
Hence, discourses are intimately connected to the production of knowledge and power, or what
Michel Foucault describes as the power/knowledge nexus.13 For example, Edward Said outlines

Shapiro, “Textualizing Global Politics,” 12. See also Said, Orientalism, 325-328.
Hansen, Security as Practice, 25-26.
11 Dunn, “Historical Representations,” 79-85.
12 Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt, ix.
13 See the various works of Michel Foucault such as “The Subject and Power,” Psychiatric Power, and History of Sexuality,
Volume I.
9

10

7

how Western scholars and experts construct and manipulate Orientalism, a flexible yet durable
discourse surrounding a constructed binary between an “Orient” and “Occident,” to essentialize
populations in North Africa and Asia into a singular, homogenous bloc. Because Orientalists are
backed by a “support system of staggering power,” Orientalism became embedded in the
institutions of imperial enterprise.14 Therefore, the production and reproduction of discourse is
part of the imperial production of knowledge and power.
The production and circulation of U.S. foreign policy discourse exposes how U.S. leadership
participates in and perpetuates the imperial production of knowledge and power. These agents of
empire are backed by a vast network of state and private institutions designed and built to support
imperial enterprise. The ability to both construct representations and discourse in service of
empire-building is, as Said states, a “sign of imperial power over recalcitrant phenomena.”15
Through connections to the state and its supplementary institutions, imperial agents co-opt
discourses and epistemologies into the imperial state apparatus. Once institutionalized, official
discourses can function as tools for imperial agents to manipulate in order to reinforce and
(re)produce relations of power. Discourse transforms into official discourse, “sanctioned
statements which have some institutionalized force.”16 Through the use of official discourse and
discursive practices, U.S. imperial agents reproduce a proliferation of boundaries, spaces, and
national identification in service of empire-building and the de-legitimation of voice or dissent and
resistance to U.S. imperial violence.17
Scholars can problematize official narratives and interrupt the construction of imperial
relations of power through critical analysis and genealogy of foreign policy discourse. Michel

See Said, Orientalism (quote on 307).
Ibid, 145.
16 Mills, Discourse, 62 (quote). See also Foucault, Psychiatric Power. For more on the intersection of the institutionalization
of imperialism and the production of knowledge/power, see Said, Orientalism ; Wallerstein, European Universalism ;
Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt ; Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa.
17 Gregory, The Colonial Present, 2.
14
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Foucault terms this sort of critical genealogy as a “history of the present.”18 U.S. officials have and
continue to use interpretations and articulations of difference, danger, and threat to (re)produce an
idealized U.S. national identity that serves as the foundation for the production of the U.S. state.
David Campbell reconceptualizes Foreign Policy discourse as a violent and complex “boundary
producing political performance.”19 As a result, the U.S. imperial state and “American nation” are
constantly in a state of becoming as policy-makers and representatives of the state rely on
discursive tools to reaffirm the imperial regime.20 As the U.S. state increasingly institutionalizes
relations and discourses of power, it becomes politically useful for scholars to problematize and
disrupt dominant narratives and representations that disavow and mask U.S. imperial world and
sense-making. Hence, scholars can use analyses of foreign policy discourse to discuss the
(re)production of relations of power in politically useful ways, especially when discussing texts and
imperial techniques that frame countries impacted by colonial and imperial legacies such as
Afghanistan.21
This project follows Lene Hansen’s model for discourse analyses to study the production,
diffusion, and permeation of dominant U.S. foreign policy discourse surrounding the relationship
between the U.S. and Afghanistan.22 This particular project focuses on the reproduction and
adaptability of official state discourse and its relation to the construction of imperial relations and
citizen-perpetrators. Most of the referenced documents are from “political leaders with official
authority to sanction foreign policies.”23 In the interest of the production of intertextuality, I
included sources that broaden the scope of the official discourse, such as oppositional voices and
the media that I argue function as complicit criticism. Therefore, this project is an example of
Hansen’s Model 2 of discourse analysis that analyzes official discourses and the wider foreign policy

Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 93 and 777. Also see Foucault, “Technologies of the Self.”
Campbell, Writing Security, 69 and 78.
20 Ibid, 134. See also Azoulay, Potential History: Unlearning Imperialism, 456-458.
21 Mills, Discourse, 106. See also Foucault, History of Sexuality, 102.
22 Hansen, Security as Practice, 10-11.
23 Ibid, 53.
18
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discussion by political opposition, media personnel, and marginal political discourses.24 The
omission of many cultural elements of discourse, such as movies, television, and other forms of pop
culture, is unfortunate as these elements remain impactful particularly in the entrenchment and
socialization of discourses and regimes of truth.25 This omission is intentional to construct limits to
the project without sacrificing the desired political critique of foreign policy as an imperial archive
in service of U.S. imperial ambition and empire-building.
In Chapter I, I outline how U.S. imperial actors manipulate the narrative around U.S. foreign
policies in Afghanistan in order to produce Afghanistan as what Ariella Aïsha Azoulay defines as a
regime-made disaster. I argue that U.S. foreign policy functions as an archive, an imperial “regime of
coordinated thresholds” that destroys worlds, alternative ways of being, and ethics of care.26 The
documents, full of political devices that normalize imperial violence, expose how policy-makers and
representatives of state mask the U.S.’s active participation in imperial world-building and render
imperial violence socially acceptable to the U.S. public and world audience. They consistently refer
to the U.S.-Afghanistan relationship according to artificial timelines and us/them binaries that
produce boundaries along the triple imperial divide of time, space, and body politics. Once the
transfer of administrations is complete, the documents are archived in elaborate, categorized online
databases that enshrine U.S. actions as part of a constructed “past.” Through the use of discourses of
danger and humanitarianism within these documents, U.S. imperial agents discursively construct
Afghanistan as a regime-made disaster, a perpetual problem for U.S. leadership to solve, monitor,
and control.
In Chapter II, I analyze how the construction of Afghanistan as a regime-made disaster fits
into U.S. empire-building and the maintenance of the imperial world order. Through the

Hansen, Security as Practice, 57.
For more information on pop culture and imperial knowledge production, see Jack G. Sheehan, Reel Bad Arabs: How
Hollywood Vilifies a People (Massachusetts: Olive Branch Press, 2015)
26 Azoulay, Potential History, 45 and 167.
24
25
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construction and surveillance of regime-made disasters in geopolitically and economically strategic
areas, representatives of the state and capitalists engage in a pointillistic form of empire-building in
which imperial agents strive to secure nation-state enclaves for the benefit of the U.S. imperial core.
This process occurs within an international world order designed to perpetuate the imperial
condition, primarily through the proliferation of a globalized nation-state system. The documents
ensconced in these archives reveal how Presidents and White House spokespeople frame the
relationship between the U.S. and Afghanistan as a “partnership” grounded in the securitization and
“reconstruction” of Afghan society. They disavow U.S. legacies of violent interventionism and mask
the unequal integration of Afghanistan into the international imperial world order. In doing so,
these officials frame the role of the U.S. and U.S. citizen as immune to prosecution for imperial
crimes by international accountability mechanisms, such as the International Criminal Court.
Hence, the documents showcase how U.S. imperial actors remove U.S. citizens and by extension the
U.S. imperial state from the realm of accountability for imperial violence.27
In Chapter III, I describe how U.S. imperial actors socialize the U.S. public into their
prescribed role as citizen-perpetrators. The maintenance of the imperial condition relies on the
distribution and weaponization of different subject positions and the socialization of people to
assume their prescribed role within the imperial world order.28 Through framing the relationship
between the U.S. and Afghanistan as in constant reference to the idea of “American sacrifice and
victimhood” in these documents, U.S. imperial actors construct Afghanistan as a site of U.S.
wounded identity grounded in “an overblown sense of injury.”29 Alongside the absence of voices of
resistance from within the archive, the documents uncover how U.S. citizens are trained to accept
the legitimacy of imperial archives and increasingly violent U.S. interventionist policies. Citizen-

Azoulay, Potential History, 554.
Ibid, 33 and 433.
29 Kazi, Islamophobia, Race, and Global Politics, 110-11.
27
28
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perpetrators, socialized to hold no empathy for those who are impacted by U.S. empire-building,
become complicit in U.S. state violence and ensure the reproduction of the imperial condition.
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CHAPTER I: The Production of Afghanistan as a Regime-Made
Disaster
This chapter examines how U.S. foreign policy discourse functions as an imperial archive
that reaffirms U.S. imperial world-building. As each successive presidency constructs new foreign
policy archives, the documents and the policies they represent are frozen in time and dis-embedded
into an abstracted “past” and transform imperial violence into an “object of history.”30 The
documents filed away into separate archives contain political devices that reaffirm artificial
timelines and boundaries along time, space and body politic. Through the documents,
representatives in all three administrations frame the relationship between the U.S. and
Afghanistan with discourses of danger and humanitarianism that represent Afghanistan as a “threat
to America.” The documents showcase the production of Afghanistan as what Ariella Aïsha Azoulay
refers to as a regime-made disaster, an imperial site that fits into U.S. empire-building.

Foreign Policy and the Archive
The work of unlearning imperialism requires analysis of the tools and techniques that
perpetuate the imperial condition, such as the imperial archive. The archive is often portrayed as a
neutral institution tasked with the collection and preservation of documents, records, and/or
artifacts. However, the effects of the archive and archival procedures go beyond the confines of a
building that houses documents.31 Azoulay describes the imperial archive as “a regime of
coordinated thresholds – … [or] imperial shutters, that underwrite a shared world.”32 The regime
does not naturally exist but is carefully produced and incorporated into imperial institutions to
promote abstraction and standardization, tenants of imperial knowledge production. Imperial

Azoulay, Potential History, 563.
Ibid, 162-164, 170.
32 Ibid, 167.
30
31
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actors produce official documents that deploy political devices, such as “peace agreement” or
“human rights,” to construct systems of differentiation for differential rule, displacement, looting,
and enslavement.33 Through the archival taxonomy of official documents seeped in imperial
terminology, the documents showcase the reproduction the imperial condition through the
transfiguration of reality and imperial crimes into records that can be locked away and forgotten.34
Archives are critical to the construction of the idea of “the past.” Each administration
receives an archive for the foreign policy documents they produce. The State Department recently
constructed a separate online archive for official documents from 2017 until January of 2021 which
contains a large, red banner at the top of the page emphasizing that what the viewer is seeing is
archived content.35 Documents in official archives of George W. Bush Jr., Barack Obama, and Donald
J. Trump have a banner on top of the webpage that reads: “This is historical material “frozen in
time”.”36 The document within these archives showcase how policy-makers frame U.S.
interventionism as a part of “the past” rather than ongoing imperial world-building. These
supposedly objective archives become a “shrine for the precious and cherished past frozen in
documents.”37
Archives and archival procedures demonstrate how imperial actors not just construct what
“was” but also attempt to classify what “is.” Through classification systems and imperial
terminology of official documents to-be-archived, imperial actors can attempt to produce a
representation of what “is” and dictate the narrative behind how the public should interpret what
“is.” Hence, archives function as a coordinated movement of imperial shutters to reinforce the
imperial rights to see everything and to define, categorize and explain how the world appears. The
movement of imperial shutters mask the violence of its production and produces boundaries along

Azoulay, Potential History, 169-193 and 457.
Ibid, 551-553.
35 The U.S. Department of State, “Afghanistan.”
36 See documents/speeches/videos in the foreign policy archives of The White House of President George W. Bush Jr., The
White House of President Barack Obama, and The Trump White House.
37 Azoulay, Potential History, 181.
33
34
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to what Azoulay refers to as the “triple imperial divide.”38 The triple imperial involves the
production of divisions in time, space, and body politic that frame past/present, subject/object, and
us/them binaries in service of imperial world-building. This distance between people and places is
necessary for “the expansion of the principle of movement” that enables the continuation of
imperial enterprise.39
Official U.S. foreign policy discourse can be seen as an example of the opening and closing of
imperial shutters as policy-makers attempt to reaffirm U.S. imperial world-building. Said describes
the particularly violent and dangerous nature of American-style Orientalism that drives U.S.
imperial enterprise. Orientalist discourse remains extremely durable and able to sustain a
multitude of different representations.40 Representatives of the state and “experts” have used these
archives to institutionalize militarized language, Orientalist representations, corporate interests,
and residual missionary ideology and rhetoric. Additionally, they deploy institutionalized language
of the archive which facilitate the construction of hierarchies of truth that frame U.S. violence as
necessary and socially acceptable.41 They have built a large network that connects Orientalist
representations with imperial enterprise, an industrial complex that profits from demonizing Islam
and “the Orient” and can be incorporated into new forms and manifestations of imperialism based
on Manichean difference and essentialization.42
The structure of the online databases and the archival procedures of U.S. foreign policy
documents facilitates the development of classification systems that underpin U.S. imperial world
and sense-making. These documents are transferred, organized, and categorized in elaborate online
databases once a new administration takes over. These archives are organized according to date,
type of document, region, U.S. Department, and more. Often, these documents are further

Azoulay, Potential History, 195-199 and 201.
Ibid, 45 (quote). See also 1-7 and 200.
40 Said, Orientalism, 285-291
41 Ibid, 45.
42 Ibid, 300 – 322. See also scholars on the Islamophobia Network such as Lean, The Islamophobia Industry and Kumar,
Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire.
38
39
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categorized according to what officials frame as separate policy “issues.” Documents, especially in
the newer 2017-2021 Archive of Trumpian foreign policies, contain keywords or tags, such as
“Afghanistan,” “Middle East,” and “National Security” to further group documents conduits of the
state determine are related based on region of focus, content, and/or category of policy “issue.”43
These archives have a series of governmental “fact sheets” that policy-makers drafted to frame U.S.
policies in Afghanistan and U.S-Afghan relations in accordance with official narratives.44 These
pages have links to various “factbook” pages which attempt to represent Afghanistan as a place-tobe studied and known. Here, visitors can view the country map, documents, geographic
coordinates, and information around demographics, economy, energy, transportation, and what the
archive frames as transnational “issues” or “terrorism.”45 These archives expose how U.S. imperial
actors make Afghanistan hypervisible and enframed in accordance with an appearance of order to
be viewed and known by a neutral, observing subject.46
Before even taking into consideration the actual language of the documents, the archival
procedure of these documents begins to produce Afghanistan as a regime-made disaster and objectof -study to be monitored. Regime-made disasters are ongoing productions of imperial world and
sense-making that require careful, strategic planning to construct. They serve the purpose of
imperial enterprise through the reproduction of politics and relations based on the principle of
differentiality.47 The separation of documents into different sub-categories framed as “issues”
begins the process of outlining how the viewer is to interpret foreign policies in Afghanistan
through an objective, neutral lens. Areas and people are represented and produced as problems
that “belong” to certain areas or populations. Through the use of political devices in the documents,

See foreign policy archives of The White House of President George W. Bush Jr., The White House of President Barack
Obama, The Trump White House, and The U.S. Department of State 2017-2021 archive, “Afghanistan.”
44 The White House of President George W. Bush Jr., “Fact Sheet: Increasing Support to Help the Afghan People Succeed,”
and The U.S. State Department Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “U.S. Relations With Afghanistan.”
45 See the CIA World Factbook Country Page on Afghanistan (https://www.cia.gov/the-worldfactbook/countries/afghanistan/).
46 See Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt, Chapters 2 and 3: “Enframing” and “An Appearance of Order”
47 Azoulay, Potential History, 359 – 366.
43
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the imperial violations of U.S. actions and interventionism become dis-embedded and placed into
the realm of the abstract, “as if they were the transcendental forms of politics, not the effect of
institutionalized violence.”48 Policies of previous administrations become seen as pieces of “the
past” rather than essential aspects of the ongoing violence of U.S. empire-building. Analysis of the
archival regime of U.S. foreign policy documents allows one to expose both the violence of the U.S.
state and how imperial relations, such as that between the U.S. and Afghanistan, are normalized and
reproduced through the strategic deployment of language and political devices. 49

“Vacuum for Terrorists”: Discourses of War and Stabilization
People in positions of power construct the politics of differential rule and reproduce the
imperial state through the language of institutional imperial archive of foreign policy documents.
To frame certain policies as necessary, policy-makers deploy the imperial terminology and political
devices to frame certain groups or areas as dangerous or threatening. These political devices
include sub-security concepts that center around the idea of determining and assessing “threats”
from which the U.S. imperial state can and must protect its citizens.50 Imperial actors begin to
discursively construct distance and boundaries between U.S. citizens, represented as a unified “Us,”
and other people and groups around the world, represented as an opposing “Them.” As boundaries
and distance along the triple imperial divide are constructed, those who occupy positions of power
can justify imperial projects. The language of foreign policy documents normalizes unequal
relations of power and represent certain places and people as dangerous to both U.S. and
international well-being.51

Azoulay, Potential History, 359.
Ibid, 171-172 and 457 – 463.
50 Some of these sub-security threats include: “strategic interests,” “national security,” and “containment.”
51 Campbell, Writing Security 172-187 and Hansen, Security as Practice, 30.
48
49
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A particularly useful political device for imperial actors is the analytic category of War. The
label of War functions as a discursive tool for imperial agents to frame present conflicts and
represent state aggression as morally justified, discrete events with established boundaries,
timeframes, alliances, and body counts.52 U.S. officials have consistently relied on discourses of
danger to facilitate imperial ambition and empire-building, such as the “Myth of the Frontier” used
to justify the expulsion and dispossession of the indigenous populations during Westward
Expansion and the demonization of the USSR as the “Evil Empire” and primary global threat during
the 1980s.53 Foreign policy documents showcase how state officials disseminate these discourses
and influence how citizens perceive areas and groups of people that the state finds a strategic
interest in surveilling and controlling.54
After the violence of World Wars I and II, international institutions required nations to
provide a legitimating rationale for aggressive interventionist policies as defensive rather than
expansionary. President Bush Jr. attempted to justify the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom in
October of 2001 as a retaliation against the Taliban’s housing of al-Qaeda. He framed U.S. actions as
part of a “new and different war … A war against all those who seek to export terror, and a war
against those governments that support or shelter them.”55 To address international and national
pressure, U.S. leaders and officials have framed U.S. violence and interventionism in Afghanistan as
part of a complex and entirely new global War on Terror. During the 1980s, “terrorism” emerged as
a politically powerful term which imperial actors could deploy to represent whole areas and groups
of people that they wished to dominate. These actors also used the concept of War to represent the
U.S.-Afghanistan relationship through a moralistic lens. Obama ran on a pledge to redirect U.S.
efforts and resources towards Afghanistan, which he framed as “the good war,” and away from Iraq,
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“the bad war.” He claimed that U.S. counterterrorism (COIN) operations in Afghanistan represent “a
cause that could not be more just.”56 Presidents and their leading officers framed the U.S. invasion
of Afghanistan as a morally justified (“good”) but completely different (“new”) form of globalized
War against the international threat of “terrorism” that required “pre-emptive” tactics and flexible
ethical boundaries.57 Through the dissemination of this doctrine of preemption, officials produced
the idea that powerful nations could attack any nation which they deemed a threat.58 Bush framed
the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan twice as a “crusade,” a conflict between an ultimate good, the U.S.
state and American citizens, and an ultimate evil Other, the international figure of the “terrorist.”
U.S leadership consistently rely on discourses of danger to construct binaries that are both
morally and racially charged and fold the concept of “terrorism” into the public imagination
surrounding Afghanistan.59 The “failed state” of Afghanistan was portrayed as the base of
operations for al-Qaeda, folding the idea of transnational terrorist groups and networks into the
“fractured but no less visibly bounded space of Afghanistan.”60 To keep the connection between the
imaginative geography of Afghanistan and the transnational terrorist networks, Presidents
consistently described Afghanistan in official documents as a “safe haven” for terrorist groups,
continuing to discursively connect Afghanistan and the threat of terrorism.61 The Trump
administration continually framed Afghanistan as a site of “immense” security threats for the U.S.
by making the assertion that Afghanistan and Pakistan contained the highest global concentration
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of registered “U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations.”62 After the U.S.-Taliban agreement
was signed, the White House also recirculated discourses of danger and framed
the agreement as part of Trump’s commitment to “keeping America safe from the scourge of
terrorism” and ensure that “Afghan soil can never be used to threaten American lives.”63 While the
spectre of “terrorism” is continually mapped onto Afghanistan, it is also represented as a boundless
threat, one that could expand its operations if not eradicated.64 Hence, Presidents have consistently
framed Afghanistan not only as a site of potential threat of “terrorism” to the U.S., but to the whole
international community.
The normalization of pre-emptive tactics and flexible ethical boundaries rely on the
weaponization of discourses of danger and the fear and moral superiority they produce within the
public imagination. The result is the production of imaginative geographies, spatializations that
transform distance and space into binaries defined by social (inside/outside) and hierarchical
(superior/inferior) binaries of difference.65 These spatializations are transformed into “geographies
of evil” as places, such as Afghanistan, are represented according to a spectrum of (potentially)
threatening difference.66 Since these archival procedures of differentiation and classification are
given substance through policy, official discourses of foreign policy, such as the War on Terror, can
be seen as an attempt by U.S. policy-makers to “establish a new global narrative in which the power
to narrate is vested in a particular constellation of power and knowledge within the United States of
America.”67
Officials not only from U.S. interventionism in Afghanistan as a War on Terror but also on a
War on Drugs. The narrative “War on Drugs” has a particularly violent and racist history in the U.S.
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and often targeted the same marginalized groups as other discourses of danger, such as women,
immigrants, and people of color.68 The War on Drugs narrative, just as the War (on Terror), fits
nicely in with other meta-narratives to demonize others and promote a society of security on a
domestic and international scale.69 Administration reports, particularly during the presidencies of
Bush and Obama, often frame Afghanistan as a site of production and distribution of illicit narcotics.
Afghanistan is frequently cited in these documents as the largest producer of opium globally which
policy-makers claim provides financial support for insurgency groups such as al Qaeda, the Taliban,
and others listed as threats to the U.S. and the broader international community.70 Obama’s
administration framed his administration’s interventionism as “counternarcotics efforts” to “[win]
the hearts and minds” of Afghans and eliminate an opiate economy that “threatens regional
stability, undermines legitimate economic development, impedes governance, and is fueling a
global public health crisis … in Afghanistan and neighboring countries.”71 The political device of
War, whether centered on “drugs” or the figure of the “terrorist,” has and continues to serve as an
integral part of the differentiation and classification systems of the imperial archive of U.S. foreign
policy.
Leaders can weaponize these boundaries through discourse to facilitate imperial ambition
and the construction of imperial subjectivities.72 Officials weaponize War narratives not only to
construct geographies of evil, but to represent U.S. intervention as part of an artificial timeline that
supposedly “begins” in 2001 and will formally “end” under the Biden administration in September
2021. Timelines are important to the operation of the imperial shutter as they are crucial to the
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production of the past, “sealing moments by fixing them in time.”73 Officials rely on constructed War
timeline and the countless timelines of “withdrawal” to try to justify the continued surveillance of
Afghanistan. They fail to mention that U.S. interventionism in Afghanistan began much earlier than
2001, such as training and supporting mujahedeen forces in Afghanistan during the 1980s.74 They
fail to mention the increasing use of drones and covert operations that continue to operate
regardless of physical troop presence.75 The timeline serves as a mask for the ongoing efforts to
disavow the U.S.’s role in the production of Afghanistan as a regime-made disaster.
Throughout these documents, Presidents have (re)created and (re)articulated “new”
timelines for withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Obama administration issued a series of everchanging timelines for “withdrawal.” In August of 2017, Trump gave a nationally televised address
in which he outlined what he called his administration’s “Afghanistan-South Asia Policy.” He framed
his administration’s policy as the elimination of Obama-era “arbitrary timetables” in favor of
continual analysis of “conditions on the ground.” He then framed the continued presence of the U.S.
in Afghanistan as necessary since a “hasty withdrawal would create a vacuum that terrorists,
including ISIS and al Qaeda, would instantly fill.”76 On February 29th, 2020, U.S. envoy Zalmay
Khalilzad and Taliban deputy leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar signed what members of the
Trump administration and media personnel framed as a “historic” and “comprehensive” “peace
agreement” which framed withdrawal as conditional on compliance with the U.S. military and
continued surveillance.77 Currently, under the current administration, Biden has issued another
timeline, one that he claims will “end of the forever war” in Afghanistan by September 11th of this
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year.78 Yet Biden stated that the U.S. will continue to assist the Afghan government, the Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) but will “not take our eyes off of the terrorist
threat,”79 thereby reinforcing the historical relationship.
For many governmental figures, “withdrawal” does not mean leaving Afghanistan entirely.
In a U.S. State Department briefing statement, they framed the conditions of U.S. surveillance as
“watching closely and making determinations about compliance based on our own judgment” and
insisted that the U.S. would “[sustain] a counterterrorism force to continue dismantling terrorist
groups that seek to attack the United States.” 80 Trump himself issued a warning: "If bad things
happen, we'll go back with a force like no-one's ever seen.”81 When asked to elaborate on the U.S.’s
withdrawal, Department Spokesperson Ned Price stated: “Well, you called it a withdrawal. I would
contextualize that. It’s a military withdrawal.”82 Hence, the archival regime of foreign policy
documents allows for the construction of the conditions of possibility for what Trinh Minh-ha refers
to as a more subtle form of colonial domination – a “dark night policy” where withdrawal simply
means the movement towards a form of U.S. militarism and interventionism that is more covert yet
designed to maintain U.S. influence.83

“Helping Afghan Women Help Themselves”: Discourse of Humanitarianism
Discourses of danger and fear are not the only discourses that facilitate the continuation of
U.S. imperial enterprise in Afghanistan. The discourse of Humanitarianism has also served as a
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political device for imperial actors to frame U.S. interventionism. Much of the discussion around
humanitarian intervention presents ideas of “human rights,” “sovereignty,” and “aid” as universal
values, but “intervention is in practice a right appropriated by the strong.”84 The imperial condition
is designed around what Immanuel Wallerstein calls European Universalism, a worldview that
emerged from Europe that attempts to define global “universal rights and values” and claim moral
superiority over their interpretation.85 Human rights language and the institutionalized language of
humanitarianism underpins the imperial drive for “progress” and “development” and eventually
the production of powerful nations, such as the U.S., as “an imperial class of rescuers”86 with the
imperial right to call themselves “liberators.”
Women and violence against women are often at the center of the discourse on
humanitarian intervention. According to critical theorist Anne McClintock, “gender dynamics were,
from the outset, fundamental to the securing and maintenance of the imperial enterprise.”87
Women, especially women of marginalized communities, serve as valuable figures for imperial
actors to use to represent imperial regimes as “progressive” and morally superior to local
populations. Heads of imperial projects attempt to justify their imperial ambition and neocolonial
projects through the representation of their policies as based on the “protection” and “well-being”
of women and their “human rights.” Imperial agents represent “women and children” in documents
through gendered, imperial tropes as victims of past and present community-based violence.
Through representations in official documents, imperial actors attempt to moralize aggressive
foreign policies and represent themselves as “liberating forces” for women around the world.88
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U.S. officials have consistently used these documents to frame the U.S. as a liberatory force
in Afghanistan. President Bush Jr. himself stated that he and the U.S. public should be proud of the
U.S. for “liberat[ing] the 25 million people of that country [Afghanistan].”89 U.S. leaders often frame
the relationship between the U.S. and Afghanistan as humanitarian intervention on behalf of the
protection of the rights of women in Afghanistan. President Bush and many of his officials, such as
Secretary Colin Powell, represented U.S. actions as “a commitment to ensure that the women of
Afghanistan have a voice in the future of their country.”90 Bush framed the U.S.-Afghan relationship
as oppositional to the rule of the Taliban where he claimed women had unprecedented “freedoms
and opportunities” in contrast to the Taliban’s “ruinous tyranny” where women faced “brutal
repression.”91 Obama claimed that the Afghan people, particularly “women and girls” under the
Taliban would be condemned to “brutal governance, international isolation, a paralyzed economy,
and the denial of basic human rights.”92 The Trump administration continued to deploy the rhetoric
that represents Afghanistan as a place for the U.S. to monitor in the name of what Presidents and
White House spokespeople frame as “liberal values” and “the rights of Afghan women.” Acting
Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Alice G. Wells framed
Afghanistan as “one of the most challenging places in the world to be a woman” that would need to
be monitored to “support the constitutional protections and gains made in the last 18 years” and
“[help] Afghan women help themselves.”93 Here, Afghan women become representations of U.S.
benevolence and “progress.”
The archive reveals how U.S. policy-makers attempt to construct the U.S. as an
internationally recognized savior of women, an example of what Spivak termed “a case of ‘White
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men saving brown women from brown men’.”94 In a 2001 radio address, First Lady Laura Bush
framed the U.S. and the international community as “civilized people” that are horrified by the
“brutality against women and children by the al-Qaida terrorist network and the regime it supports
in Afghanistan, the Taliban.”95 Obama called U.S. presence in Afghanistan part of a fight against the
return to rule of the Taliban that would “condemn their country to brutal governance, international
isolation, a paralyzed economy, and the denial of basic human rights to the Afghan people –
especially women and girls.”96 From these boundary-producing performances, Afghanistan is
represented as “uncivilized” and unable to “progress” without U.S. assistance. The documents show
how policy-makers rely on representations grounded in an imperial drive for “progress” in
combination with political devices of “human rights” in their attempts to justify U.S. continual
presence and surveillance of Afghan society.
While officials rely on the idea of “women and children” to frame U.S. intervention as
liberatory and progressive, the documents also reveal how they represent the U.S. as a force that
acts for the betterment of all the people of Afghanistan. Immediately after September 11th, 2001, an
editor of the Washington Post claimed that Afghanistan was “crying out for some sort of
enlightened foreign administration.”97 In 2007, President Bush argued that Afghan citizens were
free to “spea[k] their minds” and “begin to realize dreams” only after the U.S.-led international
coalition invaded.98 However, the documents showcase how U.S. officials attempt to literally speak
for and over the Afghan people themselves. In 2018, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Alice Wells
stated that the international community was “very focused on the rights of the Afghan people.” She
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went on to state that her remarks during what she framed as the “Kabul process” “underscored that
the Afghan people want peace but not at the cost of their dignity and advancement.”99 In July of
2019, Afghan journalist Nazira Karimi asked Spokesperson for the Department of the State Morgan
Ortagus if the White House had any comment on the vocal dissatisfaction of the Afghan people for
Trump’s rhetoric and policies regarding the U.S.-led peace process. Ortagus used this moment to
forward the idea that the people of Afghan should be grateful to the U.S. for “the countless number
of thousands, of tens of thousands of lives that – American lives and lives of our NATO allies and our
European allies that have been lost fighting in Afghanistan for the people of Afghanistan to have a
right to choose their own future.” 100 These documents reveal how policy-makers make a claim to
the imperial right to speak for the Afghan community and act in their best interest.
U.S. policy-makers frame U.S. benevolence in terms of “aid.” They describe the relationship
between the U.S. and Afghanistan as one rooted in uni-directional “humanitarian aid” and
“assistance.” They document the U.S. as “the single largest donor of humanitarian assistance,” to
Afghanistan, aid that is meant to address the needs of communities, refugees and internally
displaced persons due to “ongoing conflict and frequent natural disasters.”101 In addition, many
documents showcase the interconnected relationship between official policy and nongovernmental organizations. In 2015, First Lady Michelle Obama announced a new program
entitled Let Girls Learn. This program provides funds to bring together USAID education programs,
NGOs, and private sector investment to support the education of adolescent girls “through new
investments in areas of conflict and crisis – including in Afghanistan.”102 As the international NGO
industry often serves as a catalyst for neocolonial efforts to disseminate the ideology of European
Universalism, Afghanistan becomes framed as a site of “humanitarian crisis,” a localized problem of
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Afghan society that can be “solved” through U.S. and NGO benevolence.103 Hence, the relationship
between the U.S. and Afghanistan, framed according to the idea of U.S. benevolence, resembles what
Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah described as neocolonialism, political and economic
exploitation through aid, predatory private sector investment, and imperial institutions that serve
the interests of U.S. imperial expansion.104
The documents in the imperial archives of foreign policy indicate that officials continue the
work necessary to mask increased U.S. violence, exclusion, and surveillance. Successive
administrations craft U.S. foreign policy to discursively tie the U.S. to liberal concepts like “human
rights,” “freedom,” and “democracy.” They often resort to Islamophobic tropes of “humanitarian
intervention” to represent the U.S. as a benevolent force of global good and Afghan civilians as
imperial objects with no agency and in constant need of protection by the altruistic U.S. military.105
Pompeo often touts this rhetoric, boldly framing the U.S. military as “a force for good everywhere
and always.”106 Simultaneously, representatives of the state ignore the violence of CIA-backed
paramilitary forces, such as the Khost Protection Force, known for extreme violence, such as night
raids and summary executions that result in civilian displacement, trauma, injury, and death.107
While many official statements and briefings state that U.S.-Taliban negotiations included women
and civil society groups, multiple groups have asserted that both Afghan women and civil society
leaders were not included in U.S.-Taliban talks.108 Coalition groups such as the Free Women Writers
(  )دﺧﺘﺮان راﺑﻌﮫhave expressed concern about the exclusion of women and civil society in “peace
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agreements” and “intra-Afghan dialogue” which risks perpetuating patriarchy and U.S.
militarism.109
The U.S. state has increased its use of aerial strikes and drone operations, causing a
considerable amount of death and destruction to local Afghan populations. Under Trump, the U.S.
escalated the use of violence. This administration authorized an additional 4,000 ground troops,
increased targeted airstrikes, relaxed rules of engagement, and granted his military officials in
Afghanistan and the CIA “total authorization” “to target the terrorists and criminal networks that
sow violence and chaos throughout Afghanistan.”110 The military increasingly relies on aerial tactics
and targeted killings from jets and unmanned drones. In 2015, the Bureau of Investigative
Journalism began recording U.S. drone and jet strikes by U.S. Air Force Central Command of Central
Command (CENTCOM). Since 2015, the Bureau recorded over 13,000 confirmed strikes, killing
from 4,126 to 10,076 Afghan citizens.111 The U. S. deploys MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper drones
to minimize risk to U.S. personnel and maximize “intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance”
operations.112 Many drone operations are also conducted in secrecy by the CIA, making accurate
and comprehensive data surrounding the civilian impact of drone strikes difficult to obtain and
official figures considerably low. Yet, none of these figures are memorialized in any document
within the archives. Instead, these realities are omitted in favor of the sanitization of U.S. imperial
archives of foreign policy and representation of Afghanistan as a violent threat.
U.S. foreign policy documents function as an integral part of U.S. empire-building through
the production of regime-made disasters. These documents become representations of the
supposed “reality” of the relationship between the U.S. and Afghanistan. This relationship is
represented as grounded in discourses of danger and humanitarianism that construct Afghanistan
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as a hyper-visible regime-made disaster, a problem for the U.S. to save, modernize, and manage. The
production of spaces, particularly geopolitically strategic spaces, as regime-made disasters
underpin U.S. empire-building and fit perfectly into the international world order based on the
construction of unequal and exploitative relations. The category of “regime-made disaster” allows
analysts to see how the U.S. begins to construct imperial relations and how this is intimately
connected to conquest, capitalist exploitation, and the “proliferation of modern nation-states.”113
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CHAPTER II: U.S. Pointillism and the Imperial World Order
This chapter analyzes how the construction of Afghanistan as a regime-made disaster fits
into U.S. empire-building and the maintenance of the imperial world order. The documents uncover
how those within these three administrations framed the relationship between the U.S. and
Afghanistan as a “partnership” to securitize and “reconstruct” the Afghan state. This representation
masks the unequal integration of Afghanistan into the international imperial world order and
obscures ongoing U.S. imperial violence through the construction and surveillance of regime-made
disasters as nation-state enclaves for the benefit of the U.S. imperial core. This process occurs
within an international world order reliant on the establishment of a global nation-state system to
perpetuate the imperial condition. The documents in these archives expose how U.S. leadership and
spokespeople facilitate the integration of the U.S. state and its citizens into the international world
order as above and outside “realm of imperial accountability.”114

The Imperial World Order and Nation-State Enclaves
The term “Imperialism” entered popular vernacular in the late 19th century as
industrializing European nations intensified their scramble to acquire colonies, strategic alliances,
and spheres of influence. Liberal critics, such as John Hobson, connected Imperialism to the
development of finance capitalism but focused their efforts on the revision of imperial and colonial
policies to retain imperial control from European powers.115 Early European socialists made
economic-based arguments but through a more revolutionary framework. They emphasized how
domestic underproduction and protectionist policies to insulate domestic markets led to finance-
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capital-driven imperial expansion for new markets and outlets for overproduction. Vladimir Lenin
described this new “monopoly/finance imperialism” as the “latest stage of capitalism”
characterized by the pursuit of emerging capitalist nations, such as Germany and the United States,
to re-organize colonial divisions to their advantage.116 Early European socialists remained
committed to the conceptualization of Imperialism in terms of a linear temporality. They viewed
Imperialism as a fixed stage of capitalism that would eventually produce its own demise as
militarized national economies attempt to obtain lucrative globally dispersed raw materials and
open markets.117 While early theorists of Imperialism established an important connection between
imperial and colonial projects, uneven development, and the expansion of (finance) capitalism, they
failed to account for the flexibility and adaptability of imperial enterprise to changing world
conditions.
Uneven development and incorporation into international institutions and markets remains
a signature of ongoing forms of imperial enterprise and neocolonial oppression. Nkrumah coined
the term “Neocolonialism” to outline how imperial actors continue to engage in imperial and
colonial politics and relations as they “seek the domination of the world for the imperialism they
serve.”118 Neocolonialism can take many forms, from counseling to military assistance to advice and
“aid schemes” to efforts by international capitalists to ensure that imperial powers maintain control
and influence.119 Imperial agents, driven by the logic of capitalism, strive for the underdevelopment
of newly independent states in previously colonized areas through the development of an
international division of labor within a modern transnational capitalist system.120 Imperial actors
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maintain exploitative and politically advantageous relationships between the imperial state and
pseudo-independent states to ensure the continuation of imperial enterprise. Hence, what imperial
forces represent as reciprocal, unified processes of global interconnection and trade manifests as
“point-to-point connectivity” to connect securitized, economically strategic enclaves into complex
networks that reinforce capitalist divisions of labor and neocolonial exploitation.121
The development of an international system comprised of discrete “nation-state” units is a
hallmark of the imperial world order. From 1917 to 1919, growing calls of resistance inside and
outside of Europe built the foundation for global revolution. Colonized populations began to resist
imperial domination with ideas of “self-determination” and “independence.”122 Imperial actors
quickly and successfully transformed efforts to advance anti-colonial worldmaking into the
institutionalization of empire. With the establishment of the League of Nations, Woodrow Wilson
reappropriated the language of “self-determination” in service of the maintenance of Empire. Newly
established nations, such as Ethiopia and Liberia, were only welcomed into the League of Nations
with “special obligations” and systems of oversight “designed to discipline and civilize.”123 Early
international institutions transformed the threat of decolonization to unequal integration into
international institutions designed to preserve a racially differential principle compatible with
imperial enterprise.124
Black revolutionaries during the 1930s sought to reappropriate “self-determination” to
show how racial hierarchy and slavery serve as the foundational structures of neocolonial projects
by representing Empire as enslavement. These revolutionaries saw colonized groups as “the key
agents of global transformation” that would champion a view of an anti-imperial world as more
than inclusion, but the development of an egalitarian world order.125 To combat anti-imperial
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worldmaking, imperial figures such as Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, began to develop a “new
world order” after World War II with the establishment of the United Nations (U.N.). The U.N. was
designed to inhibit alternative modes of rule and “suppress any imaginative civil exploration of
what a different world could look like.”126 While framed as a neutral institution of international
stability and arbitration, the U.N. “renders the parceling of the world into discrete units.”127
Additionally, more powerful nations with legacies of imperial violence, such as the U.S., remain
permanent members of the Security Council, the governing body of the U.N. with the ultimate
power to veto resolutions. The U.N. is grounded in the imperial principle of differential rule as the
negotiation and arbitration of appeals occurs between sovereign nation-states.128 Imperial agents
designed the international system, through the reappropriation of anti-imperial conceptualizations
of “independence” and “sovereignty,” to facilitate the unequal integration of smaller, less powerful
states into the imperial world order governed by differential rule and continued capitalist
exploitation. Hence, the U.N. and by extension the imperial world order represent a manifestation of
the imperial right to impose a new beginning.
The U.S. capitalizes on the imperial right to impose a new beginning. The founding fathers
“imagined the fledgling federation as an empire”129 and subsequent heads of state have remained
intimately invested in “the American federalist project.” They have discursively tied the U.S.
imperial character to both foreign policies of expansion and domestic efforts to dominate
indigenous populations, enslaved Africans, and political opponents of the U.S. state. The
colonization of Hawai’i in 1898 and colonial rule of the Philippines from 1898 until 1946 are only
two examples of the U.S.’s role as a colonizing force in the world.130 The U.S. continues to engage in
empire-building throughout the world and frequently intervenes in the affairs of other states, often
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through war and militarism, to set the conditions of possibility for the spread of modern capitalism.
U.S. leaders act as architects of the imperial world order through supranational institutions, such as
the U.N., World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), that aid imperial exploitation and
domination.131 The U.S. remains a particularly influential force in what Samir Amin calls the “Middle
East Common Market” directly, through military occupation, and indirectly, through their alliances
with Israel and Saudi Arabia.132 Hence, the U.S. has always been and continues to be an imperial and
colonial power.
Despite these origins, “contemporary America is a multicultural and multireligious political
community that has yet to come to grips with its settler origins.”133 Governmental officials outright
deny U.S. imperial legacies and practices. During a 1999 presidential campaign speech, thengovernor George W. Bush Jr. framed his intended foreign policy as U.S.-style internationalism, not
an imperialist agenda. He boldly stated that “America has never been an empire,” but rather the
“only great power in history that had the chance and refused [empire] – preferring greatness to
power and justice to glory.”134 Despite the presence of countless voices that decry ongoing U.S.
imperial violence, scholars and experts continue to minimalize U.S. imperial world and sensemaking. Peter Hugill represents U.S. imperial legacies as a flirtation with “conventional imperial
expansion” during the late nineteenth century.135 Frank Ninkovich refers to the U.S. imperial legacy
as a “half-hearted involvement” that culminated in a “relatively modest colonial career.”136 Michael
Mann equates U.S. imperial policies to a sort of haphazard militarism in which the U.S. acts as an
egotistical “incoherent empire” that will eventually lead itself into ruin.137 Other scholars claim that
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the U.S. engaged in imperial enterprise by request. Geir Lundestad boldly argues that the U.S. acts as
an “empire of invitation” as European nations often encouraged the U.S. to take on a “more active
interest in the outside world” since U.S. policies “were more in accordance with the will of the local
populations.”138 Efforts to frame U.S. imperial enterprise as historic, inherently unstable, or
consensual reproduce the epistemic violence of archive of foreign policy documents that
perpetuates Eurocentrism and obscures ongoing U.S. imperial violence.

“Reduce Our Risk, Reduce Our Cost” : U.S. Pointillism and Imperial Balance
Currently, the U.S. engages in a pointillist form of empire-building that takes the form of
securitization, control, and surveillance of strategic territories scattered around the world. It
remains both imperial and territorially colonial.139 As resistance to traditional forms of colonization
grew after World War II, the U.S. developed a pointillist empire that consists of an array of military
bases and securitized points strategically positioned around the globe. This ensures a continued
territorial presence and influence around the world. In Afghanistan alone, the U.S. built military
bases such as Kandahar Airfield, Jalalabad Air Base, Camp Leatherneck, Bagram Air Base, and a
variety of hidden CIA bases. These bases operate as launching and landing points for surveillance
drones as well the selection of targets and for COIN operations in the greater Afghanistan region.140
U.S. leadership and policy-makers continue to install and promote U.S. industrial measurements,
language, and even mundane disciplinary tools such as the stop sign as international standards and
ideals for what international institutions describe as “progress” and “development.”141 Since the
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development of synthetics and vaccines transformed the accessibility and functionality of colonized
space, U.S. leadership adapted strategies of empire-building to ensure continued U.S. dominance of
international structures of governance and surveillance of geopolitically strategic areas. Hence,
Afghanistan became a militarized stepping-stone into the Central Asian region and part of a series
of U.S. wars of conquest upheld by the imperial archive of foreign policy documents.
The documents within these imperial archives expose how U.S. officials mask the
transformation of Afghanistan, a geopolitically strategic place, into a client state. After the invasion
in October 2001, U.S. officials worked to transform Afghanistan in accordance with U.S.-style
structures and institutions, such as a free-market economy and capitalism all dictated by advisers
primarily from the U.S.142 Douglas Lute, a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General, stated that “we [the
U.S. military] stated that our goal is to establish a ‘flourishing market economy’ [in Afghanistan].”143
Many local interviewees from a 2015 United States Institute for Peace (USIP) report, ranging from
local traders to CEOs of Afghan corporations, expressed disdain for what they saw as a “cut and
paste” imposition of a U.S.-style, liberal economic policy and market economy with no consideration
for the Afghan context and too quickly for the institutions to be able to adjust.144 Policy-makers
used the U.S.-Taliban Agreement to recirculate a representation of the relationship between the U.S.
and Afghanistan as economic, a relationship based on “economic cooperation” and “stability”
through U.S. efforts to promote economic growth and private sector investment.145 U.S. military
forces invaded and constructed the Afghan state as a transplanted copy of the U.S., a nation-state
enclave to serve U.S. geopolitical and capitalist interests.
Upon careful inspection, the documents in these archives reveal how the invasion and
occupation of Afghanistan have been and remains tied to the expansion of capitalism and control
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over global sources of energy and resources, such as oil and minerals.146 U.S. imperial agents
expressed interest in Afghanistan’s potential as a source of wealth as early as the 1940s. For
example, the U.S. initiated the Helmand Valley Project (HVP) in 1946, an effort by U.S. imperial
actors based on the Tennessee Valley Authority to “translate Afghanistan into the legible
inventories of material and human resources in the manner of modern states.”147 U.S.-based Unocal
Corporation proposed a plan in the 1990s to construct a lucrative Central Asian Pipeline that would
transport natural gas from Turkmenistan to India through Afghanistan. While Unocal eventually
abandoned the project during the 1990s, critics assert that the securitization of this pipeline was
the main source of motivation behind the U.S. invasion in 2001.148 Since the capture and
exploitation of extractive industries are primary tactics of neocolonial domination, U.S. experts
frame Afghanistan as a site of potential U.S. capital wealth, a nation-state enclave at the mercy of the
whims of U.S. capitalism.
These policy-makers and so-called experts continue to express interest in making
Afghanistan “lucrative” for U.S. capitalists by tapping into Afghanistan’s vast mineral potential.
From 2005-2006 and 2009-2011, The U.S. Geological Survey of the Department of the Interior and
the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) ran the USGS Mineral Resource
Project. Geological experts produced two “fact sheets” in 2007 and 2011 in which the experts assess
Afghanistan’s mineral resources. In the 2011 report, experts claimed to identify 24 prioritized
“areas of interest” (AOIs) of non-fuel mineral deposits that could be targeted for production and
development opportunities for U.S. and international investors.149 These documents indicate an
interest in the development of a “thriving market economy” and “lucrative mineral resources” in
Afghanistan. U.S. policy-makers and representatives of state rely on the political devices of
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“stabilization” and “development” in foreign policy documents that frame U.S. efforts to gain access
to Afghanistan’s wealth as an “opening up” of Afghanistan to private sector investment.
Ambassador Wells stated in 2017 that the U.S. does not want to create a “donor economy” in
Afghanistan, but desires to “develop a private sector economy” and focus energy on tapping into the
extractive sector “which has been valued at a trillion dollars.”150 U.S. agencies of “development,”
such as USAID, often center their policy language around the support of what they frame as “exportdriven economic growth.”151 Through the development of a market-based economy, Afghanistan is
simply more open to the exploitation of U.S. private sector capitalists.
The documentation in these imperial archives reveal how officials construct Afghanistan as
a nation-state enclave through their narration of a different story. They frame the relationship
between the U.S. and Afghanistan as an “enduring partnership” based on the “stabilization” and
“reconstruction” of the Afghan state and society. In 2005, Bush and President Karzai released a joint
declaration in which they framed the relationship between the U.S. and Afghanistan as a “strategic
partnership” based on “democratic principles, respect for human rights, and a market economy.”152
U.S. heads of state have consistently represented the relationship between the two countries as an
“enduring” and/or “strategic partnership.” In 2012, Obama and President Karzai signed the
“Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement.” In the agreement, Obama and Karzai framed U.S.Afghan relations as grounded in cooperation between “two sovereign nations” that have
“partnered” since 2001 to “respond to threats to international peace and security” and “strengthen
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long-term strategic cooperation in areas of mutual interest.”153 Representatives of state, such as
Ambassador Alice Wells, and official state departments, such as the Bureau of South and Central
Asian Affairs, used official documents to strategically represent the relationship between the two
countries as a “real”, “important,” or “bilateral partnership.”154 Through representations of the
relationship between the U.S. and Afghanistan as a “partnership,” officials reaffirm the construction
of Afghanistan as a nation-state within the international world order and division of labor for the
benefit of U.S. corporate greed and empire-building.
At the same time, policy-makers draft documents that vehemently deny the representation
of the U.S. as “nation-building” in Afghanistan. During his presidential campaign, Bush Jr. asserted
that U.S. troops should be deployed to fight and win wars, and not be used for “what’s called nationbuilding.” President Obama made similar claims that the U.S. would not become embroiled in what
he described as a lengthy “nation-building project.” Trump placed all the onus for “nation-building”
onto previous administrations and framed his administration’s foreign policy as focused on
national security and “killing terrorists.”155 Instead, officials reframe U.S. nation-building techniques
as policies of “reconstruction.” In these documents, they describe the Afghan state as “corrupt”
and/or “weak” and in need of “reconstruction” and/or “stabilization.” Bush, Obama, and their
officials frequently frame the Afghan state as “corrupt” and therefore unable to protect and provide
social services to Afghan civilians.156 The Obama administration swiftly reframed U.S. actions in
Afghanistan as centered around COIN operations to “reconstruction” efforts. He represented U.S.
policies in Afghanistan as U.S.-led “reconstruction” and “economic assistance” to “train, equip, and
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sustain” Afghan Security Forces.157 Through the framing of U.S. actions as not “nation-building,”
officials continue to mask the U.S.’s heavy hand in constructing the current Afghan institutions and
military forces for the benefit of U.S. imperial enterprise.
U.S. officials are interested in control over the direction of Afghan politics and economics,
but at minimal cost. The documents indicate that U.S. officials often frame Afghanistan as a regional
and increasingly international site of concern. In October of 2001, Bush framed the role of “tak[ing]
over the so-called nation-building” of Afghanistan as a job for the international community,
particularly the U.N.158 He also described what he referred to as “stabilization” and “reconstruction”
efforts in Afghanistan as the responsibility of international “partners” and the NATO coalition. Officials
continue to perpetuate the idea that responsibility for what they represent as the “Afghan Peace
Process” should be undertaken by international forces and organizations such as the U.N. The
documents uncover how policy-makers call for an “expanded role for the United Nations” in what
they refer to as peace arbitration and reconciliation efforts.159 They meet with heads of other
nations or attend U.N. sponsored summits and conferences to discuss with other “international
partners” about how to “build a more extensive regional and international consensus on
Afghanistan” and facilitate what they refer to in documents as an “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace
process.”160 U.S. and international leadership frame support in Afghanistan as reliant on “adherence
to the principles set out in the Afghanistan Partnership Framework” drafted at the 2020
Afghanistan Conference hosted by the Afghan government, Finland and the U.N.161 Under the guise
of international cooperation and “reconstruction,” the documents contain imperial language and
rhetoric. This indicates that officials continue to frame a conditions-based integration of Afghanistan
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into the international community and regional political-economic spheres at minimal cost but
maximum benefit to the U.S. Empire.
The documents bring to light how Presidents frame the expansion of the potential imperial
reach of the U.S. Empire. In his “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and
Pakistan,” Obama reframed U.S. actions in Afghanistan as part of a larger “AfPak” strategy to
address what he called “threats” emerging from Pakistan and Afghanistan.162 Trump further
expanded the imperial reach of the U.S. as he represented his U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan as
part of his administration’s greater South Asia and Indo-Pacific strategy.163 As they continually
reframe the expansive imperial reach of the U.S., Presidents reaffirm Afghanistan as an imperial
nation-state enclave that is perpetually open to U.S. intervention. They emphasize and document
how the U.S. will continue to “monitor” Afghanistan and retain a “sustained counterterrorism force”
to “dismantle[e] terrorist groups that seek to attack the United States.”164 As disagreement around
the implications of the U.S.-Taliban agreement grew, Trump issued an imperial warning: “we [the
U.S.] can always go back if we have to. If we have to go back, we’ll go back, and we’ll go back
raging.”165 Therefore, the U.S. does not withdraw from Afghanistan, for Afghanistan is enshrined in
the archive of foreign policy documents as a potential site of perpetual militarized return.
As Noam Chomsky states, U.S. militarism and interventionism in Afghanistan represents an
example of U.S. imperial world-making with “tactical adjustments to changing circumstances.”166
Since empires have historically weakened due to overextension, the documents in U.S. foreign
policy archives uncover how U.S. imperial agents frame U.S. interventionism as in need of “balance.”
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In an April 2020 interview, Pompeo framed U.S. efforts in Afghanistan as part of Trump’s “America
First” campaign to bring troops home and “get the structure right.”167 He constantly represented
U.S. efforts in Afghanistan as part of U.S. efforts to “reduce our cost, reduce our risk” abroad and
ensure national security “with a smaller footprint, with a smaller force.”168 U.S. officials adapt
foreign policy language to changing conditions to perpetuate the idea that the U.S. can or should be
free to pursue interventionism without penalty and at minimal economic and human cost.
Therefore, under U.S. imperial rule, there is no “common world to care” only “enclaves to
protect.”169 The documents expose how representatives of the U.S. state constantly (re)write,
(re)produce, and (re)inscribe the U.S.’s role and positionality within the international system on the
grounds of the idea of American Exceptionalism through political devices and techniques of
differentiation that maintain the imperial right to construct nation-state enclaves.

“The Renegade, Unlawful, So-Called Court” : U.S. Citizens and Impunity
The structure of the international world order includes few institutions designed to hold
anyone, much less imperial states, accountable for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggressive
interventionism. One such institution is The International Criminal Court (ICC), a supranational legal
institution created to hold individuals accountable to international humanitarian law (IHL) and
international human rights law (IHRL). According to Article 5 of the Rome Statute, the ICC
maintains jurisdiction over persons for “the most serious crimes of concern for the international
community as a whole,” including genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crimes of
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aggression.170 However, the ICC is founded on the protection of IHL and IHRL, two doctrines that
are full of political devices to reaffirm continued imperial violence of displacement, looting, and
enslavement at an international level. Additionally, the ICC and many other international
monitoring bodies resort to recommendations or constructive dialogue rather than definitive
accountability for violations of human rights. Critics of the international structure argue that the
international accountability system is “toothless” and fails to adequately protect marginalized
peoples from state and imperial violence.171 The ICC and other international institutions showcase
how the proliferation of nation-states reaffirms a new and differential form of sovereignty
“mediated through imperial political literacy,” or how well new states were able to conform and
comply with international standards of governance and doctrines based on liberal values such as
“human rights.”172
U.S. officials rely on the vague language and lack of enforceability of international
accountability mechanisms to situate the U.S. as above and outside of international structures. Since
drones target individuals rather than soldiers, U.S. officials use stigmatized labels, such as “unlawful
combatant,” insurgents”, “jihadists,” and “suspected terrorists,” to represent Afghans as outside of
international rights and protections.173 In fact, under U.S. national law, the President holds
executive powers to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against nations, organizations, and
individuals who either perpetrated the terrorist attack on September 11th, 2001 or “in order to
prevent any future attacks of international terrorism against the United States.”174 And, U.S. citizens
are rarely held accountable through national legal circuits. Trump personally issued war pardons
on two separate occasions for military figures scheduled to face trial in the U.S. court system for
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war crimes in Afghanistan.175 Since international institutions rely on the general nation-state legal
structures to pursue legal action against human rights violations, U.S. leadership can avoid and/or
resist anything framed as an effort to hold the U.S. accountable for imperial crimes in Afghanistan.
The construction of U.S. exterritoriality to international accountability is tied to the
construction of the “U.S. citizen” as insulated from international laws and jurisdictions. Despite its
role in the negotiation of the Rome Statute, the U.S. negotiation team rejected becoming a signatory
party to the ICC to limit the court’s jurisdiction over U.S. nationals.176 The team ultimately rejected
the vague definition of “crimes of aggression” because it could be applied to U.S. military personnel
in active combat zones and objected to the inability of U.S. officials to negotiate for “special
accommodation for anti-terrorism conventions.”177 Michael Ignatieff refers to efforts by U.S. policymakers to portray and construct the U.S. and U.S. citizens as "leaders” and “outliers” in international
politics as an embodiment of “American Exceptionalism.” These documents unveil how U.S. officials
represent Afghanistan as a space of exception for U.S. imperial violence and frame U.S. inclusion in
and adherence to international structures “on its own terms.”178
Given the sheer violence and destruction of U.S. militarism, international institutions could
pursue legal action against U.S. nationals for war crimes and/or crimes of aggression in
Afghanistan. According to the Rome Statute, a war crime constitutes the “incidental loss of life or
injury to civilians” and crimes of aggression the “bombardment by the armed forces of a State
against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of
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another State.”179 The increased use of unmanned drones has transformed all places into potential
battlefields susceptible to surveillance and a “risk-free ethics of killing.”180 This is especially the
case in Afghanistan since 2011, as drone warfare tactics has and continues to produce severe
civilian casualties and displacement. In 2019, the U.S. conducted a drone strike which Colonel
Sonny Leggert, spokesperson for U.S. forces in Afghanistan, described as a “drone strike against
Da’esh (IS) terrorists in Nangarhar.” But, the drone strike killed at least 30 civilians resting after a
day of work on a local pine nut farm.181 In a 2019 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
(UNAMA) report, UNAMA agents exposed how U.S. and U.S.-trained Afghan forces contributed to
more civilian deaths than what they referred to as “Anti-Government Forces” as 83% of the
casualties stemmed from International Military Forces “amidst reports of increasing airstrikes as
part of the United States’ strategy to target the Taliban and “set the conditions for a political
settlement” in the first six months of 2019.182 Yet, these facts are expunged from official archives of
foreign policy. In the name of “national security” and the protection of “U.S. citizen,” Afghanistan is
constructed as a space of exception where all respect for the life and well-being of the Afghan
people is destroyed.
Members of the U.S. government actively defers responsibility for war crimes and crimes
against humanity by not only avoiding mechanisms of accountability but rejecting calls for
accountability. In early 2019, NPR reported that the ICC refused a probe into U.S and Afghan Forces’
war crimes in Afghanistan due to concerns over U.S. compliance to court procedures that would
“make the prospects for a successful investigation and prosecution extremely limited.”183 This
comes after U.S. officials vehemently threatened punitive action against ICC officials if they pursued
investigative proceedings. John Bolton proclaimed that the Trump administration would “use any
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and all means necessary to protect our citizens and those of our allies from unjust prosecution from
an illegitimate court.”184 After the ICC rejected the initial probe, Trump framed the ICC’s decision as
a “major international victory, not only for these patriots, but for the rule of law.”185 U.S. officials
reiterated their disdain when the ICC authorized an investigation into war crimes against Taliban,
Afghan, and U.S. forces in March of 2020.186 Pompeo boldly called the ICC a “renegade court”
designed to prosecute “rogue regimes, dictators, others massacring people” rather than “American
soldiers.”187 The documents showcase how officials articulate a form of differential rule within the
international system that represents the U.S. as a force with the imperial right to act with relative
impunity in secured enclaves throughout the globe, the right to predation and the “subjugation of
life to the power of death.”188
The imperial right to act with impunity rests on the concept of responsibility for governance.
U.S. officials consistently represent U.S. actions in Afghanistan as support for the “training,
organizing, equipping, and sustaining” local Afghan security and military forces until the “transfer
of responsibility for governance over to the Afghan government.”189 U.S. officials often employ this
language in conjunction with representations of the Afghan government as “failed” or “corrupt” or
“incapable” of reinforcing the idea that the U.S. acts as an “advisor” and “facilitator” in an “Afghanled Afghan owned” process. Whether it be USAID’s webpage titled “Journey to Self-Reliance” to
“[help] countries solve their own development challenges” or state officials that describe security in
Afghanistan is “an Afghan issue,”190 policy-makers represent U.S. actions as necessary to make
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Afghan leaders and institutions “capable” of assuming responsibility for governance. They mask the
production of these local politicians into compliant imperial figureheads, “endowed with imperial
power and knowledge of ‘modernization.’”191 In the archive, we can see how U.S. leadership frame
“responsibility” of local Afghan actors to govern and U.S. actors to oversee Afghanistan as an
omnipotent yet invisible force with the power to act free from the constraints of international
accountability and scrutiny.
The documents expose how leading officials and spokespeople, particularly under Trump,
masked and deferred imperial responsibility in Afghanistan away from the U.S. They represented
the relationship between Afghanistan and the U.S. as a “partnership” between two sovereign
nations with the purpose of “reconstruction” and integration into global institutions and markets.
Yet U.S. officials held negotiations and made political promises of the Afghan government without
their presence in the 2020 U.S.-Taliban Agreement, such as the release of 5,000 political
prisoners.192 They framed the Afghan government and security forces as responsible for an
“Afghan-led, Afghan-owned” peace and represented violence in Afghanistan as a localized “conflict”
or “civil war” that belonged to the Afghan people. Through these documents, policy-makers
discursively transformed Afghanistan into a site of U.S. imperial sovereignty, a bounded space
where the U.S. can act without fear of retribution or scrutiny, and the U.S. state and its citizens as
immune from imperial accountability.193 In order to maintain the balance of this pointillist empire,
the U.S. imperial state depends on the socialized complicity of the U.S. citizen, or the citizenperpetrator.
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CHAPTER III: Citizen-Perpetrators and the Reproduction of the
Imperial Condition

This chapter illustrates how U.S. imperial actors socialize U.S. citizens into the situated role
of citizen-perpetrator. The maintenance of the imperial condition relies on the distribution and
weaponization of differentiated subject positions and the socialization of people to assume their
prescribed roles within the imperial world order.194 The documents within these archives indicate
that U.S. imperial actors frame the relationship between the U.S. and Afghanistan in constant
reference to events represented as sacralized moments of national trauma. Hence, through the use
of political devices in and archival procedures of these documents, policy-makers train U.S. citizens
to accept the legitimacy of the archive and construct Afghanistan as a site of U.S. wounded identity
grounded in the idea of “American sacrifice” and “victimhood.” Once socialized to hold no empathy
for those who are impacted by U.S. empire-building, U.S. citizens assume the role of citizenperpetrators and function as a foundational figure in the reproduction and normalization of U.S.
imperial enterprise.

Citizen-Perpetrators and Socialized Complicity

An imperial condition is often grounded in the “expansion of the principle of movement”
that “renders violence socially acceptable.”195 The coordinated movement of archival shutters
produces representation that functions as the underpinning of the imperial production of
knowledge. Imperial actors emerge from vast imperial epistemologies designed to protect imperial
ambition and its political manifestations. As a result, they engage in epistemic violence as they
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ground imperial epistemologies in racialized hierarchies of differentiation and the production of
subject-object, Self-Other relations through discourses of power, such as European Universalism,
Orientalism, Western Society, and Africa.196 Since archival regimes construct and maintain the
imperial condition, the process of unlearning and interrupting the reproduction of the imperial
condition involves the rejection of “the story the shutter tells” in a way where “neutrality is
acknowledged as an exercise of violence.”197
The imperial condition manifests as the indoctrination of people into situated imperial
subjectivities that frame who can be considered as fully human and who cannot, or the “distribution
of subject positions.”198 Everyone within the colonial-imperial system is socialized to internalize
these historically produced subjectivities and epistemological frames to disavow imperial violence
and colonial enterprise.199 This includes politicians, scholars, photographers, historians, and social
scientists all of whom work together to construct and uphold the neutrality of archives and the
systems of classification and differentiation that provide momentum for the movement of imperial
shutters. For example, scholars have the potential to engage in critical scholarship, speak up about
injustice, “widen the field of discussion,” and connect various anti-imperial movements across time
and space.200 Yet, many European and American scholars engage in epistemic violence against
subaltern groups, particularly women, as they attempt to define “the colonized” as an object of
study from whom they can “save” and extract “data” from for personal gain.201 Authors often disembed and de-politicize revolutionary thinkers, such as Frantz Fanon, from their respective
contexts in favor of institutionalized social science disciplines.202 Historians often construct and
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reinforce conventional narratives of national “History” through the exclusion of the experiences of
marginalized groups.203 These “experts” and social scientists illuminate the importance of
complicity to the reproduction of the imperial condition due to the ability of complicit parties to
mask imperial violence and inhibit the development of solidarity for the recovery of the human
condition.
Just as imperial points and nation-state enclaves are regime-made, so are the citizens that
uphold the imperial state.204 States and citizenship are constructed and determined through the
production and maintenance of boundaries based on borders and hierarchies of truth that
demarcate a separation between an inside and an outside. Through political devices and archival
procedures, imperial actors produce physical and emotional distance and space between
perpetrators and victims of imperial violence and socialize citizens into a constant state of
emergency.205 As a result, U.S. citizens internalize and normalize constructed “geographies of evil”
and U.S. violence and aggressive militarism as an “appropriate” response that “absolve[s] the U.S. of
responsibility.”206 Therefore, U.S. citizen-perpetrators do not see or experience themselves as
complicit perpetrators to U.S. militarism. Citizens, who acknowledge an authority, legitimacy, and
neutrality of archives and differential rule, separate themselves from the abstracted imperial
crimes tucked away in the archive. The reproduction of the imperial condition involves a series of
coordinated thresholds: the construction and balance of nation-state enclaves as well as the
production of citizen-perpetrators to uphold the imperial state.
The imperial condition is founded on the principle of differential rule and mass
displacement on domestic and international levels.207 U.S. actions in Afghanistan have caused
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significant displacement, casualties, and death. U.S. operations have caused the deaths of over 1.5
million Afghans in comparison to thousands of U.S. soldiers. Since the U.S. invasion in 2001, the U.S.
has displaced over 5.3 million Afghans as they are forced to leave their homes to escape forced
evictions, death threats, drone strikes, and “large-scale ethnic cleansing.”208 Those framed as
outside of the U.S. imperial state are labeled as non-citizens, “refugees,” and “displaced.” Many of
these refugees and displaced persons remain in a perpetual state of “being-in-expulsion,” acting as a
constant challenge to the modern nation-state system.209 Within these documents, these crimes are
framed as a result of a “humanitarian crisis” or “civil war” in Afghanistan. Through the documents
in these archives, representatives and spokespeople for presidential administrations socialize and
train U.S. citizens to support or ignore grotesque state violence and accept the legitimacy of the U.S.
archives and differential body politics that protect them from state violence.210 Citizens then
assume their prescribed role as citizen-perpetrators.
Citizen-perpetrators function as the backbone of the imperial state through their complicity
and acceptance of imperial rights, such as the right to destroy worlds and rule.211 In the U.S., the
role of citizen-perpetrator is grounded in a weaponized form of national identification that
facilitates pointillistic empire-building. Since national leaders are constantly involved in negotiating
the ideal “national identity” and policies that constitute it, states are always in the process of
“becoming.”212 Officials put a considerable amount of time and resources into the weaponization of
emotions such as fear, nostalgia, and paranoia in service of the development of a masculinist
ethnonationalism in the U.S.213 Those who construct and frame conceptualizations of “National
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Identity” rely on the performativity of nationalist representations.214 In his influential essay,
“DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation,” Homi Bhabha
conceptualizes the “Nation” as “a narrative strategy – and an apparatus of power – that produces a
continual slippage into analogous, even metonymic, categories, like the people, minorities, or
‘cultural difference’ that continually overlap in the act of writing the nation.”215 Foreign policymakers strive to produce a unified, idealized national sense of identification that is exclusionary of
even U.S. citizens framed as outside and/or against the representation of the good “American
citizen,” such as the black community, the queer and trans community, the disabled, the
undocumented, and women. These marginalized communities within the U.S. experience the
devastating effects of differential rule such as differential treatment, increased levels of
surveillance, and consistent violence from the U.S. state. The archival regime extends this
differential treatment internationally, as “the way America treats its marginalized citizens at home
is mirrored in the way it treats both its foreigners of color within and its others abroad.”216 Through
systems of differentiation and the production of citizenship, U.S. officials construct a sense of
national identification rooted in white supremacy and hyper-militarized ethnonationalism and
“gained through the exclusion and denigration of others.”217
Citizen-perpetrators become grounded in the performance of a wounded national identity.
The documents uncover how officials construct a wounded and militarized national identification
that functions as the foundation for the imperial subject, the citizen-perpetrator.218 As
governmental personnel frame the country and its citizens as outside and above international
accountability, U.S. citizens come to see themselves as exceptional, excluded from the violent world
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of colonialism and capitalist exploitation.219 To reinforce the construction of nation-state enclaves
of the U.S. pointillist empire, U.S. leadership map threats of War and Terrorism onto imperial
points, like Afghanistan. Presidents and those who claim to speak on behalf of the state then frame
strategic moments in U.S. history as moments of extreme injury and exceptional national trauma for
citizens of what is represented as the “American nation.” 220 This allows officials the opportunity to
frame the relationship between Afghanistan and the U.S. as one based around the idea of U.S.
suffering and sacrifice. Therefore, Afghanistan becomes a site of U.S. wounded identity and
exceptional “American victimhood” as the U.S is represented as a benevolent victim, a force of good
that continues to suffer from the aggression from those labeled as “Other.”

“American Blood and Treasure” : U.S. Wounded Victimhood
From these foreign policy documents, we can see that U.S. officials represent the
relationship between Afghanistan and the U.S. as rooted in what is framed as exceptional U.S.
victimhood. Through the weaponization of fear, memorialization of 9/11, and glorification of
“American victory” and “sacrifice,” officials disseminate discourses of danger that facilitate a state
of paranoia of potential danger. This permanent state of insecurity provides policy-makers with an
opportunity to manufacture “bogeymen” and frame nation-state enclaves as sites of threats to be
controlled, surveilled, or even eradicated.221 The weaponization of the affect of fear becomes
intimately tied to the production of geographies of evil and systems of differentiation that reaffirm
the imperial state. U.S. citizen-perpetrators become immersed in what Achille Mbembe calls a
“society of enmity,” a perpetual state of being driven by a desire for an enemy, a fantasy of
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extermination, and the anxiety of annihilation that drives U.S. imperial world-making.222 As U.S.
citizens gradually internalize geographies of evil and subsequent affect of fear, they come to accept
the principle of differential rule that protects and insulates U.S. citizens from experiencing
themselves as perpetrators to imperial violence.
U.S. foreign policy members can look into the archive and strategically select events that can
be reframed and transformed into sacralized moments of exceptional U.S. suffering and
victimization. Many legitimizing rationales of the imperial condition, such as the War on Terror,
pivot around one particular moment from U.S. history: September 11th, 2001 (9/11). 223 U.S. foreign
policy-makers framed 9/11 as an essential, defining moment in the relationship between the U.S.
and Afghanistan.224 While 9/11 had the potential to build global solidarity, U.S. officials represented
9/11 as an “act of war” from a growing threat of anti-American “terrorism.” From the constant
replay of news footage and images to annual memorial gatherings with ceremonies and speeches to
the 2010 Park51 “Ground Zero Mosque controversy,”225 U.S. officials, experts and media outlets
construct their representations of 9/11 around Islamophobic rhetoric that reinforce what Nazia
Kazi describes as Orientalist myths that reaffirm empire, such the myth that Islam is inherently
violent and the myth that Muslims are incapable of democratic self-rule.226 These representations
serve the logic of capitalism, as a vast network of Christian Zionists, misinformation experts, and
radical neoconservatives that Nathan Lean dubs the Islamophobia Network, profit from this
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manufactured “Green Scare” and militarized national identification in service of U.S. empirebuilding.227
The documents in foreign policy archives reveal how policy-makers transformed 9/11 into
an exceptional tragedy that fit comfortably into other anchor points of “American victimhood,” such
as the Cold War and Pearl Harbor.228 U.S. officials continually reproduces “small traumas” through
the constant reminder of “the tragedy” and the “horrors” of 9/11. The Bush Jr. Administration
consistently pivoted their representations of U.S. actions in Afghanistan around the memory of
9/11 as an exceptional tragedy.229 9/11 has even been memorialized through the construction of an
official “9/11 Memorial Museum” on the exact site where the Twin Towers stood in New York.230
Many officials reference 9/11 as a marker for time through the differentiation between a “pre” and
“post” 9/11 world. As officials and experts frame 9/11 as a new beginning, they participate in the
transformation of 9/11 into a marker of imperial temporality framed as the beginning of a “new”
era dictated by threats and crises that Afghanistan and its people pose.
As they mapped the figure of “the terrorist” into the imaginative geography of Afghanistan,
officials represent and project the blame for the “horror” and “tragedy” of 9/11 onto Afghanistan. In
his 2009 speech, Obama framed the U.S. experience in Afghanistan as one of sacrifice, stating that
“nearly 700 Americans have lost their lives” and “troops from over 20 countries have also paid the
ultimate price.”231 In 2014, he reframed the U.S. experience in Afghanistan as “progress” at a “heavy
price” since “2,200 American patriots who have made the ultimate sacrifice, that last, full measure
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of devotion, right here in Afghanistan.”232 Both Trump and Pompeo have continued to weaponize
the memory of 9/11 and frame Afghanistan as a site of “American sacrifice.” In his “Afghanistan and
South Asia Strategy” speech where Trump claimed, “nobody can forget the horrors of 9/11” and
that “9/11, the worst terrorist attack in our history, was planned and directed from Afghanistan.”233
Framed as the source of U.S. victimhood and national trauma, policy-makers can weaponize the U.S.
national identification in service of perpetual war and interventionism in Afghanistan.
These documents also bespeak how U.S. Presidents and members of their administrations
construct an increasingly masculinist and militarized national identification represented by the
figure of the “American soldier.”234 As they continue to represent Afghanistan as solely
“responsible” for the events of 9/11, officials simultaneously represent the figure of the “American
soldier” as the embodiment of the ultimate “good.” In countless documents, these officials refer to
U.S. soldiers as “brave Americans” who have sacrificed themselves “to protect U.S. and allied
citizens – including those in the Hague – and to give the Afghan people a chance at a better life.”235
Presidents give elaborate speeches at military bases and represent soldiers as the epitome of the
“American nation.” Policy-makers advise U.S. citizens, framed as a unified ”the American people,” to
look to soldiers for “inspiration” as they are represented as the embodiment of “the best that our
country has to offer – the virtues that have made America great for more than two centuries, and
the values that will keep us great for centuries to come.”236 Soldiers are represented as a “fierce
brotherhood of firefighters” and the epitome of “the bravery and generosity of ordinary citizens.”237
Trump himself called U.S. soldiers “the special class of heroes whose selflessness, courage, and
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resolve [that] is unmatched in human history.”238 Through the glorification of the figure of the
soldier, governmental personnel continue to reinforce not only the construction of imperial
relations, but the consolidation of the nation as well as the production of U.S. citizens as complicit in
U.S. imperial world-making.
The documents also expose how policy-makers expand the glorification of the figure of the
“American soldier” and frame the U.S. as a successful, powerful force of good throughout the world.
They continually frame the “greatness” of the U.S. in terms of representations of “progress” and
“victory” in Afghanistan. In order for the imperial state to construct and pursue these projects of
empire-building “ordinary people must accept that these actions better the world, uplift a broken or
downtrodden population, or spread positive values like democracy.” 239 The Bush, Obama, and
Trump administrations have consistently framed U.S. militarism as part of conflicts that the U.S.
would eventually “win.”240 On July 4th, Trump gave a speech in South Dakota in front of Mount
Rushmore where he represented the U.S. citizen as part of “the most magnificent country in the
history of the world.” He framed the U.S. as exceptional in comparison to every other nation, stating
that “no nation has done more to advance the human condition” and “no people have done more to
promote human progress than the citizens of our great nation.”241 Leaders frame the U.S.Afghanistan relationship through “victory,” “progress,” and “greatness” narratives and discursively
tie “Afghanistan” to the public imagination surrounding “9/11.” 242 Citizens come to see and
understand U.S.-Afghan relations as a relationship built on a combination of “American
sacrifice/victimhood” and “American greatness.” Afghanistan becomes a site of complex U.S.

The Trump White House, “Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia.”
Kazi, Islamophobia, Race, and Global Politics, 90.
240 The Trump White House, “Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia” ; The White
House of President George W. Bush Jr., “Rebuilding Afghanistan”; The White House of President Barack Obama, “Remarks
of President Barack Obama.”
241 The Trump White House, “Remarks by President Trump at South Dakota’s 2020 Mount Rushmore Fireworks
Celebration | Keystone, South Dakota.”
242 See Minh-ha, Lovecidal, for a more in-depth analysis of the discourse of “American Victory” (37-41 and 123-130) and
Campbell, Writing Security for more on use of foreign policy to frame neocolonial projects as “conquest” and
“intervention” that represent national strength and international progress (165).
238
239

58

wounded identity and a place that U.S. citizens see and understand as “underserving” of grief and
care.243
Foreign policy documents uncover how representatives of the U.S. state weaponize the idea
of a national identification rooted in wounded attachments to constructed national tragedies, like
9/11, and an inflated sense of national self. Through these documents, officials frame Afghanistan
as distinctly different, a site of threat to the fabric of U.S. society, identity and economic, political and
social survival. The result of discourses of danger and national sacrifice is the production of
ressentiment, defined by Pankaj Mishra as the mixture of envy, powerlessness and humiliation that
fuels militant patriotism.244 In the documents, officials enshrine the representation of the
relationship between the U.S. and Afghanistan as defined by both the idea of “American sacrifice”
and “American greatness.” As a result, they construct and reproduce natural hierarchies of systems
of classification and differentiation that produce U.S. citizens as complicit in the disregard for the
lives of those affected by U.S. imperial violence. The internalization of systems of differentiation and
the production of citizen-perpetrators becomes increasingly evident when one looks at how
documents and archives framed as “criticism” recycle the same representations and themes as U.S.
official discourse.

“A Staggering, Costly Failure” : SIGAR, the Afghan Papers, and Complicit Criticism
The success of the indoctrination of U.S. citizens into the role of citizen-perpetrator can be
seen in what is framed as “criticism” of U.S. actions in Afghanistan. Azoulay argues that criticism
based on systems of classification and differentiation rooted in the distinction between citizen and
non-citizen facilitates the production of citizen-perpetrators who “conceive of themselves in a
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differentiated, not shared, world.”245 Officials and critics alike often describe The Office of the
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) as a source of critique for U.S.
efforts in Afghanistan. According to official documents, SIGAR was established by presidential order
in 2008, as a third party, independent “watchdog” organization to monitor and report on U.S.
activities in Afghanistan. SIGAR has a vast online archive of reports and documents divided into
sections and sub-categories of differentiation. The SIGAR archive has all reports organized into
different tabs and archived for online viewers to peruse. SIGAR launched a “Lessons Learned
Project” (LLP) in 2014 that has produced eleven different reports centered on imperial language,
such as “Counternarcotics,” “Support for Gender Equality,” “Corruption in Conflict,” and
“Stabilization.”246 Throughout the eleven official reports, SIGAR agents continually regurgitate
political devices and representations, such as “reconstruction” and the representation of the Afghan
state as “weak” and “corrupt.” Under the tab “Special Projects,” SIGAR holds a library of “fact sheets”
that frame the “facts” about U.S. actions and relations with Afghanistan. The archive of SIGAR
represents another threshold that reproduces the archival taxonomy of the U.S. imperial state.
Ultimately, SIGAR documents contain the same political devices and imperial rhetoric as
those in documents found in foreign policy archives. SIGAR agents discursively connect U.S. actions
in Afghanistan to the idea of imperial learning. Policy-makers who draft SIGAR reports continue to
frame U.S. involvement as “inefficient” or a result of “poor planning and execution” rather than
imperial world-building. In SIGAR’s High-Risk List Report from 2016, SIGAR agents continued to
represent the idea of “American sacrifice” as the “high costs” of “reconstruction” efforts. They frame
SIGAR as an organization for the protection of the “enormous investment that American taxpayers
have made in Afghanistan.”247 They also represent the LLP program as an effort to “preserve
lessons from the U.S. reconstruction experience in Afghanistan, and to make recommendations to

Azoulay, Potential History, 272.
See reports in the SIGAR “Lessons Learned Reports” archive.
247 116th Congress, “Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction’s 2019 High-Risk List,” 4.
245
246

60

Congress and executive agencies on ways to improve our efforts in current and future
operations.”248 In SIGAR’s 2020 High-Risk List, SIGAR agents continue to forward the
representation of U.S. interventionism as incomplete and necessary due to what they frame as eight
“high-risk areas.”249 Therefore, SIGAR functions as a form of complicit criticism that furthers the
normalization of U.S. imperial violence as a socially acceptable “object of history.”250 SIGAR agents
center their reports on “recommendations” based on the idea of “improving” the balance of U.S.
empire-building to avoid imperial strain without sacrificing imperial benefit. These documents
reveal how forms of critique, especially those that stem from within the imperial state, continue to
(re)make imperial ambition as adaptable to the construction and maintenance of imperial relations.
Another source framed as criticism is the Washington Post’s exposè entitled “The Afghan
Papers.” In 2019, the Washington Post released this multi-part exposé comprised of over 600
documents, including SIGAR interviews and a series of Donald Rumsfeld’s “Snowflake” emails
surrounding U.S. operations in Afghanistan since 2001. While experts and media outlets often
framed the exposé as an overwhelming critique of U.S. aggression and militarism, the Washington
Post continues to recycle imperial terminology and differentiation that represent Afghanistan as a
site of imperial learning. All 611 interviews and documents are housed on a single online database
and grouped according to six “story topics”: “Spin,” “Strategy,” “Corruption,” “Nation-Building,”
“Security Forces,” and “Opium.”251 The documents indicate that the architects of U.S.
interventionism, such as policy-makers, military and government officials and aid workers, framed
their criticism around the idea of inefficiency, lack of coordination, poor planning, and reliance on a
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rotation of “experts” faulted only for being “ignorant” about Afghanistan society and politics. They
also continually referred to U.S. actions as part of ongoing projects of “reconstruction” or part of the
U.S.’s “economic investment” in Afghanistan. These critiques do not expose or outline the imperial
crimes of the U.S., they simply reproduce the idea that criticism of U.S. actions in Afghanistan pivot
around the idea of “inefficient” and “incompetent” U.S. imperial world-building in Afghanistan that
could be improved rather than challenged.
The documents in supposedly critical archives showcase how authors often recenter the
idea of “critique” of the relationship between the U.S. and Afghanistan around the U.S. experience
rather than elevating the voices of Afghan people that have been left out and excluded from the
archive. The authors of the Washington Post exposé had the potential to include criticism from local
voices, especially those from marginalized communities most affected by U.S. violence. Local critics,
such as Zarlasht Halaimzai, the Director of the Refugee Trauma Initiative, continue to vocalize their
concerns regarding U.S. militarism and so-called “humanitarian” intentions that have little to no
consideration for “the unimaginable suffering to Afghan and American families.”252 Yet these voices
were again left out of both official and critical archives. Instead, 23 out of 25 of the “25 essential
documents from the Afghanistan Papers” were from the U.S. and U.S.-led NATO and 22 were male.
Only two interviewees were local Afghans, former official Mohammed Ehsan Zia and former
governor Tooryalai Wesa.253 Wesa centered his critique around U.S. official’s pursuit of social
programming in Afghanistan with little to no consultation with local officials or Afghans. For
example, he stated that U.S. officials concocted programs to teach locals how to wash their hands,
which was incredibly insulting given that locals wash their hands five times a day for prayers.254
Despite the complicit dimensions of the Washington Post exposé, U.S. leadership continues to
trivialize any form of critique of U.S. interventionism or imperial violence. Defense Official Mark
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Cancian and defense policy expert James Carafano both framed the exposé as inconsequential, and
they reiterated that the Pentagon would not change their policies despite the release and
dissemination of the exposé. The inclusion of those most affected by U.S. violence could have served
to expose U.S. militarism in Afghanistan rather than reinforce the discursive representation of elite
U.S. “experts” and military forces as the voices of both “expertise” and “criticism.”
At a joint news conference with the Australian Prime Minister, Trump claimed that his
administration could end what he framed as “the war” “very quickly” except “many, many, really,
tens of millions of people would get killed, and we think it’s unnecessary.”255 By framing the deaths
of millions of Afghan people as “doable” but “unnecessary,” Trump represents the continuation of
mass moral disengagement and disregard for the lives of those affected by U.S. empire-building.
Through these documents, policy-makers and complicit critics facilitate the production of a
“banality of evil” that renders violence against Afghans and the reproduction of the imperial
condition socially acceptable.256 Therefore, foreign policy documents are not just words or
“policies” that can be recorded, stored, and forgotten in various archives – they are intimately tied
to violence, discrimination, and prejudice that has devastating effects on the lives of areas, groups,
and people that Presidents and members of their administrations wish to dominate and control.
Since no colonizing power colonizes innocently, representatives of the state, policy-makers,
complicit critics, and citizen-perpetrators are dehumanizing themselves through concerted efforts to
destroy worlds, dictate international politics, and construct relations between peoples based on
“domination and submission.”257 From these documents, we can see that official documents,
narratives, and forms of liberal critique will not produce an anti-imperial revolution “for the

Wagner, “Trump says he could end Afghanistan war quickly but ‘tens of millions’ of people would die.”
Waller, Becoming Evil, 98-106 and 174-176.
257 Cèsaire, Discourse on Colonialism, 5-6. See also Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth and Black Skin, White Masks. Here,
Fanon discusses how colonial violence produces neuroses and a “sick society” that relies on the (re)production of
racialized “delirious Manichaeism” that constructs “white” and “black” as situated, hierarchical categories that order
society and produces inferiority complexes and psychological neuroses (See Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 47-50 and
Black Skin, White Masks, 160 and 180).
255
256

63

Master’s tools will never dismantle the Master’s house.”258 Therefore, the time is now to look
elsewhere and begin the shared labor of reparations and repair necessary to open the door to the
possibility of an anti-imperial condition.

258

Azoulay, Potential History, 31 (quoting Audre Lorde).

64

CONCLUSION
The unbearable imperial condition cannot be changed with this destructive call for the impossible in
the form of a new beginning … instead, it is the threshold of unbearability that should be restored and
used in order to cry out, “not everything should be possible!”
Ariella Aïsha Azoulay, Potential History: Unlearning Imperialism (2019), pgs. 55-56
Imperial violence is our shared commons and therefore “all imperial crimes are surely the
common inheritance of humanity.”259 U.S. foreign policy documents expose how this imperial
condition we live in is constructed and maintained through the production of regime-made
disasters, the establishment of unequal relations between states, pointillistic empire-balancing,
militarized patriotism, and ultimately socialized complicity. The documents within foreign policy
archives reveal how heads of state and their personnel mask the movement towards non-public
and more covert forms of “occupation lite”260 in Afghanistan through discourses of danger, systems
of differentiation, and political devices that represent violence, interventionism, exploitation, and
impunity as socially and internationally acceptable. These documents are then nestled into archives
where violence and violation become part of a constructed “past” rather than ongoing and
perpetual imperial enterprise. As citizen-perpetrators increasingly accept and internalize the
neutrality of these archives, the imperial world order is reaffirmed and increasingly “dispossessed
of tenderness and love.”261
Imperial actors and the citizen-perpetrators they reproduce emerge from the colonial
matrix of power designed to reproduce racialized social categorization according to Eurocentric
norms and the unequal international division of labor.262 Hence, those integrated into societies with
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colonial legacies and socialized in imperialist epistemologies can start the shared labor of
reparation through the interruption of the production of themselves as citizen-perpetrators and an
open refusal to remain complicit in the violence of the U.S. imperial state and the imperial condition
as a whole. Both victims and perpetrators are needed to begin the process of recovery for the
human condition and the end of imperial forms of domination and exploitation.263 This involves
perpetrators and those who benefit from systems of differentiation that insulate them from
imperial state violence to engage in deep and difficult reflection and the assume of “responsibility
for not letting the perpetrator vanish."264
This project, then, is a commitment to an anti-imperial project that is both intellectual and
political and an ongoing effort to reclaim the right to not be a perpetrator of U.S. imperial
violence.265 It is both a piece of scholarly work and an inherently political statement that rejects
official discourses that claim to speak and act “for the nation” and “the American people.” This
project suggests the potentially transformative power in active and open rejection of U.S. imperial
discourses and political devices that representative of the U.S. state weaponize to perpetuate U.S.
imperial world-building. Derek Gregory issues a warning: “insofar as we [U.S. citizens] assent to
them, often by our silence, then we are complicit in what is done in our collective name.”266 U.S.
citizens can seize this moment as an opportunity to firmly establish a threshold of unbearability to
continued violence by the U.S. state in their name.267 They can disavow their privileges and go on
strike until the U.S. acknowledges imperial crimes and begins to engage in the labor of reparations.

The recovery of the human condition is always possible, for “justice, reparations, redress of the
world can never be too late.”268
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